accompanying resources as possible, the subnational governments would prefer the opposite case. The balance between these two extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government 2 . Figure 1 depicts this approach.
Figure 1: The Complexity of Devolution
Beginning at the bottom of the diagram, the legitimacy of subnational and national governments is determined for the most part by processes of history and respective political support. Of the former, culture, language, and religion have traditionally India, and the US had systems in which the regional tier of government played any significant role. And even in some of these cases the role of regional governments had been waning. This was, for example, the case of the US, where the power and functions of the states had been declining with respect to those of the federal government since at least the reforms introduced by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression (Donahue, 1997), or of India, where the centrally based mechanism of planned economic development over five year periods, put in place immediately after independence, undermined the power of the regions, since the central government dictated financial and economic goals to the states (Sury, 1998) .
At the beginning of the 21 st century this panorama has radically changed. A devolutionary trend has swept the world. In some cases, subnational turbulence has led to the complete demise of former countries and to the emergence of new states, whose dimension is often no larger than that of most regions. The fifteen constituent republics of the former Soviet Union have become independent states; Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; four new states have emerged of war-torn Yugoslavia, and Kosovo and Montenegro may follow suit. This phenomenon is, however, not exclusive to former eastern European socialist countries. In Africa, Eritrea achieved independence after a long guerrilla war, and
East Timor has recently emerged as an independent state after twenty-five years of Indonesian occupation.
To contextualise, the emergence of new independent states is an extreme form of a more general, global trend in the transference of powers, authority, and resources to subnational levels of government. Many formerly centralized states have witnessed some form of devolution, and many states that were already decentralised have experienced even greater transfers of power to meso-levels of government. Few spaces around the world have remained untouched by this trend. Eight out of the fifteen members of the current EU -comprising 87% of its population (Rodríguez-Pose, 2002 , p 174) -have seen some level of decentralization. In addition to the already federalized Austria and Germany, Belgium became a federal state in the early 1990s and Italy is in the process of federalization. Spain, despite not being a federal state, is arguably the most decentralised state in Western Europe. France has taken limited steps towards regionalisation -with ongoing debates over the granting of regional autonomy to Corsica -and the UK and Portugal have transferred a considerable amount of power to some of their regions. Poland has also recently followed the path towards regional devolution.
Outside Europe, the devolutionary trend has been widespread, especially in large and heterogeneous states. In some cases, regional autonomy has been granted ex nihilo.
This is the case of Indonesia, which passed autonomy laws aimed at undoing decades of extremely centralized government and at appeasing separatist tendencies in 1999 (Aspinall and Berger, 2001 ). In China, although political devolution has not formally occurred and the Chinese Communist party still keeps a tight grip on political developments, there has been widespread fiscal decentralisation that has provided regional and local governments with considerable powers and greatly encouraged policy innovations at the regional level (Ma, 1996, p 5) .
In other cases, pre-existing levels of regional autonomy have been greatly enhanced.
The most striking cases of decentralization have been those of Latin American countries. In Mexico the collapse of the economic system in 1982 and the political uncertainty that followed led to extensive changes in territorial politics. Although
Mexico's constitution has officially been one of federalism since at least the revolution of 1910 4 , extreme presidentialism and the dominance of the executive branch of government over the judicial and legislative branches ensured seventy subsequent years of centralism and an enduring centralist culture (Rodríguez, 1998, pp 235-6) . But as Ward and Rodríguez (1999, p 28) assert, the last two decades have seen a dramatic improvement in the political systems of representation, accountability, flexibility, and democracy throughout the country and have led to a profound reform of territorial politics in support of greater federalism.
In Brazil, the powers of the states were considerably reinforced after the passing of the 1988 Constitution. The 'regional interests' lobby was extremely influential during the drafting process and was well placed to capitalise on the anti-central government sentiment that had been development during military rule (Coutinho, 1996, p 7) .
Following the pattern set by earlier Brazilian constitutions, the regions were able to secure residual powers of legislation in the states rather than the centre and maintain a lack of any clear constitutional demarcation of responsibilities between the state, the centre and the local governments (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, pp 9-11) . This has subsequently afforded them a hitherto unprecedented level of discretion over their own financing, administration, and responsibilities.
Among the states which had considerable regional autonomy before the onset of globalization, the trend has also been towards even greater decentralization. In India, the over-concentration of power in the hands of a few national elites since independence and until the early 1980s brought about a reaction that started to redress the balance from the centre to the regions (Sharma, 1999) . In the US, the trend towards centralization which some trace back to the American Civil War or to the Great Depression, started to be reverted during Nixon's presidency in the early 1970s (Donahue, 1997 Keating, 1998) . Uneven regional economic development, alongside the achievement of greater economic efficiency through decentralization, are coming to the fore and gradually starting to occupy the bulk of the regionalist discourse in favour of decentralisation. The Northern Italian Leagues were the first to heavily base their devolutionary claims on economic demands, after their relative failure to gain visibility by using traditional ethnic or linguistic arguments (Segatti, 1992; Diamanti, 1993; Torpey, 1994) . Nationalist and regionalist parties in Spain have increasingly resorted to similar arguments, as indeed have the Zapatistas in Chiapas.
Additional factors also contribute to boost the legitimacy of decentralizing claims. In some circumstances, decentralization goes hand in hand with democracy. This is the case of Brazil and most of Latin America, where the advent of democracy and decentralization are intrinsically related (Shah, 1991; Souza, 1997) . Spain represents a similar case: forty years of dictatorship generated greater legitimacy for the devolutionary cause, and contributed to the profound territorial transformation of the Spanish state after the return to democracy (Pérez Díaz, 1990) . In other circumstances, decentralization tends to accompany changes in the economic regime -especially moves towards the marketisation of national economies. This trend has been followed in India (Roa, 1997), China (Ping, 2000, p 180; Da-dao and Sit, 2001, p 29 ) and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico and Brazil, since the opening of these countries to trade.
The process of devolution operates through transfers of authority and resources.
Subnational governments across the globe currently enjoy greater authority and powers than they did a few decades ago. The trend is widespread. (Tomaney, 2000; Tomaney and Ward, 2000) .
Outside Europe, the transfer of authority from the centre to the regions has also taken place. The US has, for example witnessed devolutionary efforts centred around two key areas: welfare and medical insurance (Schram and Soss, 1998 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 year % Finally, decentralization has also implied a substantial transfer of resources from the centre to the regions. Figure 2 illustrates the growth in subnational government expenditures as a proportion of total government expenditures in our case countries between 1982 and 1999. Two points are apparent. First, there is an average increase of around 15% in the proportion of governmental expenditures carried out at the subnational level in the group of countries as a whole, indicating a movement towards devolution in general and decentralisation of resources in particular. Second, as the framework in Figure 1 implies, not all countries are party to this trend. Some countries (i.e. Brazil, China, or Spain) have witnessed a considerable decentralization of resources, which, in the cases of Brazil and China, has not been accompanied by similar levels of decentralization of authority. In other cases, such as India, the decentralization of authority has not been matched by a similar decentralization of resources, since the share of central government expenditure has increased slightly at the expense of that of the regional governments during the period of analysis.
Differing Forms of Devolution
Having established the existence of a widespread trend towards devolution, this section addresses its diversity, with reference to the theoretical discussion in section 1.
Recall that the inter-relationship between the relative legitimacy of governmental tiers and the form of devolution we can expect to find in a given country was examined. In In Brazil, the 1988 Brazilian constitution was written in an environment of pronounced hostility towards central government control (Hagopian, 1996, p 259-62 and 268-9) . Constitutional provisions to curb national party dominance resulted in a lack of consistent central politics, a persistent feature of the Brazilian system since the return to democracy. In 1990 the 27 states were represented at the central level by and (at least in relative terms) rising state legitimacy … (T)he fraction of respondents identifying the federal government as "the level from which you feel you get least for your money" rose by 10 points (to 46%) between 1989 and 1994 alone'. This rise in legitimacy of the states has acted to curb to the responsibility emphasis so prominent in previous devolutionary efforts. As an illustration, President Clinton's reluctance to devolve responsibilities for medical health, although trumpeted as a moralistic decision in order to safeguard equity, was prompted by widespread resistance from the states whose fears over defective funding procedures stemmed from their experience of welfare reform (Offner, 1999). As regional and state-level politics continues to become more important in America, such checks and balances, facilitated by the democratic system and the electorate's confidence in regional politics, will act to equalise the devolution of responsibilities and resources. In the future, greater resource devolution to the states may become a political necessity for the centre.
The Impacts of The Devolutionary Trend
At this point we are able to draw two conclusions. First, as evidenced in section 2, the devolutionary trend is a common and general one. Second, however, this generality should not be mistaken for homogeneity. As section 3 reveals, there are different forms of devolution that arise from different legitimacy distributions. This section reassesses the implications of the trend in the light of its virtual universality and complexity.
From a strategic-political perspective, we should not be surprised to learn that the awareness of the advantages of devolution tend to be more developed than the awareness of drawbacks. Whether devolution is driven mostly by national or subnational governments, each potential driver has an inherent interest in defending their policies to the electorate and bolstering their legitimacy and popularity. The most common supporting arguments for devolutionary policies draw upon the efficiency advantages that lower level governance can engender (Oates, 1972; Donahue, 1997; Keating, 1999) . Given that the population in any country has a diverse preference structure, which varies across geographical space, this efficiency has three major sources, the themes of which recur time and again (Oates, 1972) .
First, a smaller democratic and financial base should result in a managerial reform that would lead to a heightened degree of accountability, bolstered by the reduced administrative distance between the electorate and the politicians (Bennett, 1990; Hatry, 1994) . Second, the lack of diluting influences brought about by responsibilities for alternative, diverse regions, tends to allow local governments the flexibility to respond to the preferences of their 'customers' or electorates (Bennett, 1990) . And third, the local nature of governance implies a greater chance of local politicians with the specialist knowledge necessary to detect and react to the wishes of the electorate and defend their interests at higher levels (Putnam, 1993) , as well as the capacity to implement policy innovations that would have been more difficult to pursue at the central or federal level (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 1997) . The basic conceptual argument of devolutionists therefore acknowledges these three factors as acting to both ensure and allow local governments to be more representative of and responsive to the interests of a given locality or region. Thus, public policy in general is brought closer into line with the diverse preference sets of a nation and welfare efficiency increases. Moreover, for those whose interests are not represented in their original location, there is in theory an increasing opportunity to choose and move between both regional and local governmental systems as devolution progresses and the diversity of public systems available to a nation as a whole increases. Arguments in favour of devolution are therefore underpinned by free market assumptions, such as easy mobility, the political-economic machinery of choice and democracy, and rational models of public sector behaviour under a democratic framework. There are areas, however, where developments associated with the global decentralizing trend we have identified cast doubt on the rosy picture of greater efficiency, greater democracy, and greater welfare painted by devolutionists. In the following subsections we explore some of these developments by focusing on three aspectsefficiency issues, equity issues, and administrative issues. The aim is to shed more light on the diversity and contradictions of devolutionary effects.
Efficiency Issues

Devolution and Debt
As has been discussed in earlier sections, devolutionary initiatives in our case countries have often included some separation of responsibilities from resources. It is rare to find a simultaneous decentralisation, since the driving actor behind devolutionary efforts will invariably have incentives to separate these two factors one way or another (see Figure 1 ). Under these circumstances it is common to discover a mismatch between responsibilities and financing, which, as Bennett underlines, have 
Inefficient Competition for Industry
A further factor that threatens to proceed from efforts towards administrative devolution concerns the phenomenon of territorial competition. The proliferation and greater powers of subnational governments are shifting the focus of development policies away from achieving greater equality or national cohesion, towards securing greater economic efficiency at the local level (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998).
Consequently, there has been an increasing tendency for subnational governments to engage in competition for the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Scott, 1998; Vernon, 1998) . When subnational governments offer incentives for mobile industry to locate within their region, and the private sector firm chooses between the most attractive packages offered by the states, the impact upon national efficiency could be damaging. Cheshire and Gordon (1996) conceptualise this situation in terms of a zero-sum game -one in which the aggregate payoff of the game for all the actors involved is autonomous of the final outcome of the game across the actors.
Specifically, the total gain of the arrival of a firm in a given country will be the same, example, a 15% flat rate on corporation tax, 2 years' tax exemption on profits and a further 3 years' 50% tax reduction. Ma (1996, p 15) documents the nature of these zones, which, by mid 1993, had swelled in number to around 1800 across China.
Crucially, there were no official standards in the level of concessions that could be offered by the zones. The lack of an official standard of concessions has led to the development of highly intense competition, with concessions often extended well beyond the example above, towards extremes such as five tax-free years and a further five years' 50% tax payment.
The impact on China as a whole of the development of these zones may well have been detrimental for the reasons Cheshire and Gordon (1996 and 1998) provide. Ma (1996, p 15) points out that not only are concessions available to internationally footloose companies, but also to indigenous companies in an attempt to attract them from one region to another. No discernible national economic gain from the resources expended on inducing these movements, which boil down to a simple spatial reallocation of industry within the nation, can be expected. Furthermore, McKenney (1993, p 20-1) points out that in Beijing, one of the richer and more tax-effective areas in China, the ability of the subnational government to extract the taxes rightfully owed to them in their economic zones has been extremely poor. Over-dependence on large firms in some areas, and a multitude of small, semi-informal firms in others, has contributed to grave difficulties in tax collection at the provincial level. All in all, while much industry has been attracted to China through economic zones, especially from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, the efficiency cost through competitive concession making across provinces detracts markedly from the advantages.
Equity issues
One of the traditional roles of national government is the redistribution of resources in order to safeguard minimum levels of welfare throughout the country.
Decentralisation of authority and resources undermine a central government's ability to achieve this in two fundamental ways. First, devolution of decision-making authority progressively transfers the responsibility for devising ways in which redistribution will occur to subnational government. This leads, in most cases, as seen in Figure 2 , to an increase in subnational resources at the expense of national budgets.
Second, this tier of government is multifarious, and it is often the case that larger or more prosperous regions are over-represented at this level. Hence, following devolution, a smaller role for national transfers and a larger voice for the regions in deciding how transfers are allocated is likely to result in a less progressive system of fiscal redistribution than under a centralist system (Thompson, 1989) . The political and economic muscle of stronger regions is likely to skew public expenditure in their favour, regardless of whether the greatest legitimacy is based in the centre or in the regions and of whether the financing system of regions is based on local tax revenue or on grants from the centre. In the former case because the devolution of fiscal powers will inevitably favour wealthier areas, and in the latter because the greater political muscle of larger and richer regions may be reflected in a greater capacity to secure transfers from the centre and to impede the evolution of a more centralised regional system of transfers or regional policy, as Markusen (1994) demonstrated in the US case. 
Institutional and Political Issues
Three further issues concerning the understated downside of the devolutionary trend outlined in section one merit attention. First, and most obviously, devolution involves an increase in the number and a decrease in the size of administrative units, with accompanying costs. Second, more subtly, lobbying costs under a decentralised system are likely to exceed those under a central system. In much the same way that regions compete for mobile capital under the territorial competition framework outlined at the beginning of this section, subnational governmental units also compete for central financial assistance (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . And in the same way at competitive bidding between regions, the expense incurred during the process of competition for government financing is a deadweight loss to the nation as a whole.
Moreover, we can expect these losses to become greater as subnational governments become more powerful and complex. The proliferation of intra-governmental conventions and reviews of fiscal relations, for example in Brazil (1989 ), China (1994 ), and Mexico (1995 underscore the importance, complexity, and expense associated with public redistribution and it is perhaps no co-incidence that these conventions tend to co-incide with devolutionary trends. Third, devolution of authority carries with it the threat of increased corruption. By its nature, this factor is difficult to measure, but the incentive structure that decentralised systems present to self-interested actors is enough to raise our concerns (see Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 1997, pp 181-184 
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to bring to attention the general trend in decentralisation and to outline the complexity of both its forms and implications. To this end, some of the key issues surrounding the mechanisms of devolution were addressed and incorporated into an informal model at the start of the paper. This model identified three factors of decentralisation as composing the devolutionary trend -legitimacy and the decentralisation of resources and of authority. Some of the interest-conflicts arising from the co-existence of these attributes of devolution were addressed in order to deepen our understanding of devolutionary mechanics. The relevance of this understanding becomes clear in lieu of the following section, which outlined the depth and breath of the global trend towards devolution. In those countries with centralised systems 20 or 30 years ago, decentralisation has been widespread, and in those countries with initially more vertically dispersed government systems, further decentralisation from their respective starting points has become the trend. This global tendency towards the devolution of authority and of resources elevates the importance of understanding this phenomenon. To this end, the theoretical arguments of the first section were then applied to our group of case countries in the third section, which exposed the diversity of devolutionary efforts across the globe.
In the fourth section, given the understated heterogeneity of devolutionary processes, the parallel heterogeneity of devolutionary implications was addressed. In response to the widely held belief that decentralisation generally increases efficiency, facilitates choice, and holds the public sector more accountable than under a centralised framework, a critical examination of each of these hypotheses was presented. The expectation that devolution leads to greater efficiency can be called into question on the grounds that the process tends to engender both debt and territorial competition which are harmful to national efficiency. The gains from devolution through the matching of public services to a heterogeneous population preference structure is a static argument that may overlook dynamic alterations in the behaviour of the actors involved. In these two cases, the incentive structure facing the national and subnational governments alter, and present the potential for opportunistic interaction that is damaging for the economy as a whole. While the matching argument remains strong, it should therefore be weighted against the expected losses through these factors before any devolutionary processes are undertaken.
In terms of equity, evidence was present to support the case that decentralisation of resources is often times regressive from a territorial point of view. The combination of dwindling central government outlays in relative terms with the greater bargaining power of the richer, larger, and/or stronger subnational authorities frequently leaves weaker and poorer regions in a worse financial state than under a centralised system.
Section four concluded with a brief discussion of the administrative, lobbying, and corruption costs that devolution is also likely to entail.
In summary, it is imperative for policy makers to recognise varying forms of decentralisation and to be aware of the vested interests of national and subnational governments across these alternative devolutionary forms. It is also imperative that commentators, policy makers, and analysts remain aware of the context of debates and opinions surrounding devolution. It is no co-incidence that devolution tends to be supported by national electorates -in many ways it is inevitable -because powerful and influential actors seek to muster the support of the electorate to facilitate their own initiatives. At the same time, however, this situation might well be damaging if enthusiasm for devolution is not tempered with, first, an awareness of the context of any debates that occur, and, second, an awareness of not just the benefits but also of the understated drawbacks devolution can engender. The prescription of this paper is therefore cautionary with respect to both the interpretation and promotion of devolutionary efforts.
